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To comply or not to comply: Evidence on changes and factors associated with the changes in compliance with the UK code of corporate governance
Introduction
In Shabbir and Padgett (2008) we investigate the link between an index of noncompliance (hence forth called the Index) with the UK code of corporate governance (hence forth, the Code), and firm performance for a panel of FTSE350 companies over the years 2000 to 2003. We find greater non-compliance to lead to lower total shareholder returns in our sample of firms. In this paper I delve deeper into the compliance practices of the same panel of firms. I first investigate the changes in the Index and then explore the factors associated with these changes. Given that the Index relates to non-compliance with the board related recommendations of the Code, any change in the value of the Index would reflect changes in the board 1 .
It can be argued that governance, including compliance with any regulatory requirements such as the Code, becomes more important at a time when companies and markets are in trouble. The time period covered in this study, specifically the years 2000 to 2003, (when the stock market in the UK was on a downward trend for most of the period), then offers a particularly good opportunity to study how companies' compliance with the Code varies. That is, how the changing firm and market related conditions and the firm's own position of strength or weakness viz. a viz. the various firm and market related factors, including changes in the company's operating and stock market performance, and increased takeover activity, affect its compliance with the Code.
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My findings indicate that over the period covered, large listed companies in the UK, which are in a relatively weak position as indicated by their falling operating or market performance or those which undergo reorganization become more compliant while firms who engage in prominent takeover activity or take on more debt or experience rising operating or market performance, all indicators of their relative market strength, become less compliant. Overall, my findings suggest that firms behave in a rather opportunistic manner in terms of their compliance, becoming more compliant when they are in trouble, and less concerned when they are relatively strong. These findings are consistent with the argument implied by many studies investigating the governance-performance link, including Shabbir and Padgett (2008) , and Black, Jang and Kim (2005) , suggesting that companies use internal governance mechanisms including compliance to signal the quality of their governance and hence the quality of the firm. This in turn has a positive impact on the firm's market value and performance. From the investors point of view, however, firm's changing compliance practices suggest that (assuming compliance indicates better governance), to discern the governance quality of a firm it is important to look at firms' compliance practices beyond a mere year or two.
Before I proceed to discuss the changes in the Index and the factors affecting these changes, I reproduce here the construction of the Index to give the reader information on what the Index covers: "The Index is constructed by assigning one point for each aspect of non-compliance with either the letter or the spirit of the Code. Thus, the board should be chaired by an independent non-executive director (0 if so, 1 if not); the board should consist of onethird non-executives (0 if so, 1 if not), the majority of whom should be independent (0 if so, 1 if not); the board should have a senior independent member other than the chair, to whom concerns can be conveyed, (0 if so, 1 if not); board should have a remuneration, audit and nomination committee (0 for each, 1 for each added if not present); the committees should be headed by independent non-executives, (0 if so for each, 1 for each if not); the remuneration committee should be composed entirely of independent non-executives (0 if so, 1 if not); the audit committee should be composed of non-executives only, have majority independent non-executives, (0 if so, 1 if not); nomination committee be present (0 if so, 1 if not) and finally, the 5 nomination committee should be chaired by an independent non-executive, who could be the chairman (0 if so, 1 if not). With this scoring system, a firm's index score can vary between 0 and 12, with 0 indicating perfect compliance and 12 indicating complete non-compliance". (Reproduced from Shabbir and Padgett, 2005; p. 9) 
Setting the Context
The time period covered in this study, i.e. 2000 to 2003 is a period marked by a major stock market downturn followed by a high level of takeover activity in the UK. As The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in section 3, I present a review of the relevant literature; section 4 discusses the data and the variables used; followed by an analysis of the changes in the Index in section 5; descriptive statistics on all relevant variables are presented in section 6; section 7 presents the correlation matrix for all the variables used in the empirical analysis, which is presented in section 8; section 9 summarises and concludes the paper. Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988; and Raheja, 2005) . One paper examining the dynamic changes in the US context is by Denis and Sarin (1999) , who investigate the factors associated with significant changes in ownership and board structures in public corporations in the US. Covering a ten year period (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) , they find that contrary to general belief, board structures undergo significant changes in a given year. A total of 65% of the sample firms in their study, exhibit either a significant change in ownership structure (exceeding 5%), in the fraction of outsiders on the board (exceeding 20%), or a change in the board size (exceeding 2 members) in any given year. To the best of the knowledge of the current researcher no prior empirical work in the UK, has examined dynamic changes in boards or investigated the factors affecting these changes.
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Data, Variables and Predicted Relationship with Changes in the Index
Data Sources
The Reorganization in the context of this study mainly means de-mergers/asset sales but may also involve other forms of asset restructuring including share buybacks. Given that the firms in the current sample are those for which data on the changes in the Index are available for the four years, therefore in the case of a merger/acquisition, the firms in the sample would be ones that are the acquirers, rather than the acquired firm.
The latter obviously would cease to exist in the final year of the study i.e. 2003, once it was taken over in any of the preceding year. Data on the constituents of the FTSE All Share Index which has been used to calculate the takeover threat has been collected from info@ftse.com, while data on all financial variables has been obtained from DataStream.
Explanatory Variables and Predicted Relationships
There is little prior empirical guidance on the nature of the association between merger/acquisition activity and board changes, but assuming that following the acquisition, the acquirer would take on its board, directors from the acquired firm, this should lead to an increase in the number of executives and non-independent nonexecutives on the boards of the acquirers, thus decreasing compliance. Although this 9 from a signalling point of view, would not be seen positively by the investors but it could be reasonably argued, that an acquiring firm would consider the perceived benefits from acquisition to far outweigh the perceived costs of non-compliance.
Hence I a priori expect a positive relationship between a merger/acquisition event and the change in the Index for a firm i.e. an acquisition would lead to a rise in the Index.
Contrary to mergers and acquisitions, reorganizations are events that a firm usually undertakes following poor performance or an actual or perceived corporate control threat. Hence, in some ways these are defensive actions and are meant not only to improve internal efficiency, but also to send a positive signal to the market that the firm is taking positive steps to improve its performance. One such step being increased compliance. Hence, I a priori expect a negative relationship between any reorganization event and changes in the Index, implying that as a firm reorganizes, its
Index will fall, with the firm becoming more compliant.
In line with the above argument, generally speaking, the higher the corporate control threat experienced by a firm, the more likely it is to take steps that are seen favourably by investors -increased compliance being one such step. According I a priori expect a negative relationship between the probability of takeover variable and changes in the Index, assuming that increased threat of takeover would tend to increase compliance, hence leading to a decrease in the value of the Index. This variable is calculated for each year preceding the year of the change in the Index, as a percentage value of the total number of firms within the 2-digit FTSE global classification system that were taken over in a particular year divided by the total number of firms in that 2-digit FTSE global classification system that were a part of the FTSE All Share Index, at the beginning of that year.
According to agency theory predictions (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) , debt by reducing free cash flows, can act as a bonding mechanism reducing the need for other forms of monitoring, in this case compliance. This suggests that increase in leverage should lead to increase in the Index. In terms of whether higher leverage indicates a weakening or strengthening stance for a company, prior event studies suggest a positive response of the market (i.e. higher abnormal returns), when a firm increases its debt. This is because increased leverage signals future reduction in free cash flow, as well as indicates higher ability (in form of higher earnings) of the firm to service its debt. Thus, according to agency theory predictions, I a priori expect a positive relationship between the changes in leverage and changes in the Index. To study the association of the changes in capital structure as measured by changes in leverage with changes in the Index, I include the change in the debt to asset ratio of the firm over the same period as the change in the Index as an explanatory variable.
Prior studies like Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) Hence the following analysis uses the firm's own prior period stock return.
Analysis of the Changes in the Index
I start by an analysis of the changes in the Index. This analysis will give us an insight into how board structure and composition has changed in our panel of firms over the four years of the study. As Table 2 To gain a deeper understanding of the behaviour of the firms in terms of their compliance/non-compliance, I next analyse the frequency of non-compliance of the firms with each component of the Index for each of the four years of the study. This will give us an insight into which recommendations of the Code are the firms most compliant or non-compliant with and how this behaviour is changing over time.
As Table 3 indicates, 62 out of 107 firms in 2000 i.e. about 58% of the sample had either an executive or a non-independent non-executive as the chairman of the board. On the whole, the preceding analysis suggests that compliance, which in turn represents changes in the board, has not been very stable over time. This finding is consistent with the earlier evidence of Denis and Sarin (1999) in the US, who also find boards to be not as stable as generally assumed, especially during turbulent times.
Firms it appears continuously reassess their board structures in the light of internal and external developments and adjust them accordingly. In Table 4 , Indexchng stands for Index change, Ebitchng stands for EBIT change, Chngda is the change in debt to asset ratio and pbtov is the probability of takeover.
Correlation matrix
Given in Table 5 are the full sample and cross sectional correlations of the changes in the Index with each of the explanatory variable. The above table shows that for the full sample, the changes in the Index are significantly positively correlated with mergers and acquisitions, and marginally insignificantly negatively correlated with reorganizations. This suggests that generally, firms which engage in mergers and acquisitions tend to become less compliant, perhaps because they experience an initial rise in operating and/or stock market performance, following the merger which tends to make them less concerned about compliance or more simply, because they take on more non-independent directors on board from the company taken over or merged. Although not reported here but the correlation between mergers/acquisition variable and the stock return 
Empirical Analysis
Given that the firms exhibit a varying trend in compliance over time, I first analyse the cross section of changes in the Index, followed by an analysis over the entire Consistent with a priori expectations, Table 6 shows that factors that signify a weakening position of the firm namely undertaking reorganization, and increased takeover threat, all lead the firms to become more compliant. On the contrary factors that signify relative strength of the firms namely their acquisition activity or their higher leverage, make the firms less compliant. It appears therefore that firms which acquire other firms and possibly take on more non-independent directors from the acquired firm are less concerned about their worsening board-related compliance than about the perceived positive economic benefits of acquisition (as implied by their act of acquisition itself). This finding is supported by the analysis in Table 3 Reorganizations, on the contrary, which could be seen as a defensive action in response to business shock, tend to make firms more compliant. In addition, asset sales, a form of reorganization, would tend to decrease the executive directors on the boards, especially those linked to the assets disposed off, thus decreasing the number of executive directors on the board. The positive relationship between prior period change in operating performance and the change in the Index is again consistent with expectations. Firms which would have experienced a decline in their prior period operating performance would tend to become more compliant while those whose performance improved would become less compliant thus indicating a positive association between the two. I now turn to an investigation of these relationships over the entire period, to see whether these hold when considered over the entire sample. Table 9 presents the results of the model in equation 1 (including two year dummies to control for time fixed effects) over the entire period. Taken over the entire period, only the effect of acquisitions and change in leverage, are found to be significant and consistent with expectations. Nevertheless, though insignificant, many variables are only marginally so (for e.g. reorganization has a tstatistic much greater than 1 (-1.34) as does prior period stock return (1.43), implying marginal insignificance). Further, the signs of all explanatory variables are consistent with a priori expectations. Accordingly, one can draw a conclusion albeit tentative one, that, large listed firms in the UK, not only tend to vary their compliance with the board related recommendations of the Code, but, that compliance increases/decreases in line with the company's position of weakness and strength in terms of the various firm and market related factors affecting compliance.
Summary, Conclusions and Implications
In this paper I accomplish two objectives: First, I investigate how firms change their compliance practices over time and second, I analyse the possible factors motivating these changes. Given that the period covered in this study presents a time when the 22 stock market was falling, it offers a particularly rich context for evaluating how firms respond to turbulent times, particularly in terms of compliance with the Code. While for companies these findings are consistent with their expected approach towards compliance, most likely to use it as a signal to convey the governance quality of their firm; for investors, to discern the well governed companies (i.e. those which are consistent in compliance, and hence consistent in their governance quality) it is important to look at a firm's compliance beyond a year or two.
